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1. INTRODUCTION 
Recently Friedman has developed, in a series of papers [4, 5, 61 the theory 
of differential games influenced by the work of Fleming [I, 2, 31, Varaiya and 
Lin [lo] and Roxin [9]. The general approach here is to define a differential 
game in terms of a sequence of approximating deterministic games, to show 
that there exist a value and a saddle point and to extend the method to other 
types of games. 
Given a differential game it is, in general, rather difficult to find exactly 
the value of a game and consequently, it is of practical interest (see Isaacs [7]) 
to obtain an estimate of the value. We, in this paper, direct our attention to 
this problem. We find that the comparison principle that has been a basic 
tool in studying the qualitative behavior of differential equations, can appro- 
priately be extended to differential games to answer this problem. More 
specifically, we plan to reduce the study of a given differential game to the 
study of a relatively simple scalar differential game and then compare their 
respective values. This technique, we feel, offers useful estimates of the 
value of differential games. Also, it could be exploited in other situations in a 
fruitful way. Our approach, therefore, depends on a systematic use of Lyapu- 
nov like functions and the theory of differential inequalities. An example is 
worked out to demonstrate the meaning of the results. 
2. PRELIMINARIES AND DEFINITIONS 
Let us consider the differential game associated with the differential system 
x’ = qt, x, y, 4, x(to) = *o f (2.1) 
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on J and the payoff 
P = P(y, 4 = p(x) + I::” H(s, 44, Y(S), 44) ds. (2.2) 
Here t, > 0, J = [to, t, + T], T > 0, FE C[J x R” x Y X 2, R”], Y, Z 
are fixed compact sets of R R1, Rnz respectively, p is a real-valued functional 
on C[J, Rn], H is a real-valued function J x R” x Y x 2 and y(t), z(t) 
are measurable control functions on J such that y(t) E Y, z(t) E 2 for almost 
all t E J. In this game, (2.1), (2.2), the player y regulates the control y(t) and 
tries to maximize the payoff P, while the player Z, controls z(t) and wants to 
minimize P. 
Corresponding to the given game, we need to consider the scalar differential 
game relative to the differential equation 
U’ =f(t, % u, w), u&J = uo 9 (2.3) 
on J with the payoff 
Q = Q@, w) = q(u) + ?^I:-’ &, u(s), +), w(s)) ds (2.4) 
where f E C[j x R x V x W, R], V, W are fixed compact sets in R, 
Q is a real-valued functional on C[j, R], h is a real-valued function on 
J x R x V x Wand v(t), w(t) measurable control functions on J satisfying 
v(t) E V, w(t) E W for almost all t E J. In the scalar game (2.3), (2.4), the 
players o, w are the counterparts of the players y, z in the given game (2.1), 
(2.2), i.e., z, wants to maximize Q regulating suitably the control v(t) and 
w tries to minimize Q by proper choice of w(t). 
We assume that both the games start at t = to and end at time t = to + T. 
In order to connect the two differential games that we are considering, we 
need the following assumptions. 
(H,) There exist functionsL E C[J x R”, R],L, E C[Y, V],L,: 2 ---f W 
such that L is locally Lipschitzian in x and 
D+L(t, 2) = liy ;sp $ [L(t + h, x + hF(t, x, y, z)) - L(t, x)] 
+ 
G f (h L(t, 4, h(Y), G?(4) 
for (t, X, y, x) E J x Rn x Y x 2. 
(Hs) For (t, x, y, x) E J x R” x Y x 2, the functions H, h satisfy 
the inequality 
W *, Y, 4 < W, W 4, L,(Y), L&N 
and h is nondecreasing in u for each (t, a, w). 
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(W For 9 E CL W, PM) < d$h where W = W, 4(t)) and q(t) 
is nondecreasing in E E C[J, I?]. 
(HJ For each pair of controls y(t) and x(t), there is a unique solution 
x(t) for (2.1) on J and the solutions of (2.1) are uniformly bounded on J. 
(Hs) For each pair of controls v(t) and w(t), there is a unique solution 
u(t) of (2.3) on J and the solutions of (2.3) are uniformly bounded on J. 
We next define the upper and lower S-games, upper and lower values 
and give necessary details concerning these concepts. We adapt the termino- 
logy developed in [4] to suit our purpose. 
Let S = 2-r, r being a positive integer and let N = 2’. Introduce the 
intervals 
Ij=[tEJ:t,+(j-l)6~t~t,+js], 1 <j<N. 
Denote by Yj(Zj , Vj , Wj) the set of all measurable functions on Ij whose 
values belong to Y(Z, V, W) for almost all t E J. Define the mappings for 
j-1,2 N, >*-*, 
P*j, z, x z 2x *.. x zj+ Y,; 
As,j: Yl x Y2 x *.. x Yj+Zj; 
Z”*f: w, x w 2x ‘.. x wj+ vj; 
-w: v, x v 2X ‘.* X Vj+ Wj. 
The vectors 
P = (P-l,..., PN), As = (AsJ,..., As.f”), Z” = (/ml,..., P*N), 
and 
(16 = (IP,..., ny 
are called upper S-strategies for the players y, z, v, and w respectively. 
Likewise, if we define the maps for 2 < j < N 
r*,j: Yl X Zl X e-e X Zj-l+ Yj; 
A8.j: Zl X Yl X ... X Yj-l+Zj; 
2T~sjZ VI X WI X ‘** X Wj-I+ Vj; 
A,,j: WI X VI X ... X Vj-I+ Wj; 
the vectors I’,, , A, , & , A, will be called the lower d-strategies for the players 
y, z, w, w in the same order. 
Let us take any upper a-strategy .Z6 for v and any lower S-strategy A, for 
w. The player w starts the game by choosing w1 = A6,1 on II and the player v 
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reacts with his choice vu1 = PJ(w,) on I1 . Thus when w makes a choice 
wi = 4,&J, > 7) r ,..., ~lj-r) on Ij , v chooses vj = l?*j(w, ,..., pi) on 1i . This 
scheme is called an upper &game for the scalar game (2.3), (2.4). The cor- 
responding controls and the solution of (2.3) will be denoted by rP(t), w,(t) 
and us(t) respectively. The payoff Q relative to this scheme is written in the 
form 
Q(G, wJ = Q(As , a??) = Q[L& , E- ,..., L’&, 2V-j 
and the upper a-value is defined by 
A, , Z” being the vectors defined earlier. 
Analogously, lower a-games and lower &value may be defined for the 
scalar game. For example, V,,, takes the form 
V,,, = inf sup *.. inf sup Q(& , LP). 
%l &l .T+~ d,N 
In a similar manner, we can define VI6 and I’,,, for the game (2.1), (2.2). 
Under the hypotheses (H4), it is known [4] that the game (2.1), (2.2) has the 
following properties: 
(i) VI6 = inf sup P[& , P] = s;f inf P[L& , P], 
A6 rs 4 
where 
sup = sup a*. sup ) 
ra j-&l J-&N 
inf = inf a** inf ; 
4 4.1 As.~ 
(ii) 
where 
sup = sup ... sup ) 
rs %l l-&N 
inf = inf a** inf ; 
A8 A&l A&N 
(iii) the limits 
v,+ = $9 V18, --f v,- = l&l v, -3 
exists and satisfy VI- $ VI+. 
If vr- = VI’, we say the game has a value and the value is given by 
VI = VI+ = VI-. One needs additional restrictions for any game to have 
vabe. (See [4] for details). 
Analogous properties for the comparison game follow because of (Hs). 
409/41/2-I 5 
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3. I~ESULTS AND EXAMPLE 
We are now in a position to prove our main results 
THEOREM 3.1. Assume that hypotheses (H,), (Ha), (Hs), (H4), and (HJ 
hold. Suppose further that on some nonempty set Z,, C 2, the junction L, is onto 
and has a continuous inverse. Let L(t,, , x,,) < u,, . Then 
(i) V,+ < V,+ and (ii) Vi- < Va-. . 
Proof. We first prove (i). Let us consider upper &games. In view of 
hypotheses (HJ and (HJ and the definition of an upper S-value, it follows 
that, for each E > 0, there is a lower S-strategy (1”, for w and an upper S-stra- 
tegy fs for y such that 
V2” 3 Q[& , P] - E, for all ,P (3.1) 
and 
VI6 < P[A8 , p’“] + E, for all A, . (3.2) 
We now show that, for each upper S-game, there exist controls ys, a, , v6, and 
w8 corresponding to the strategies fs, A, , Z6 and /1”, respectively, such that 
v6 = L,(yS) and ‘% = L?(%). (3.3) 
For this let w choose ml,8 = Aa,, on 1r and let z choose zi,* such that 
Z1,dt) E 4 and 
UUtN = wl,6(t) on 4 . 
It is clear by the assumption on L, that aI,8 = Ai,, is uniquely defined. Using 
the strategy fs, let the choice of y be y1,6(t) = P*1(.z1,6(t)) on 1r . Finally, let 
v choose vlS(t) = L,(y,“(t)) on I1 . Again this choice vi6 = PL is uniquely 
defined. On Is , w then chooses ~a,~ = (1;,6(v1s) and the scheme is repeated. 
Since in this scheme, the choice of yjs and w~,~ on Ii determine .~~+r,~ and 
vQ uniquely on Ij+l and Ij respectively, it follows that the controls .zi and vu6 
correspond to some strategies ds and P. This proves the existence of con- 
trols y8, as, vs and w8 satisfying (3.3). 
Denoting the corresponding solutions of (2.1) and (2.3), for these upper 
s-games, by x6(t) and G(t), relations (3.1) and (3.2) take the form 
W, x6(s), YW, G(S)) ds - E (3.4) 
and 
h(s, d(s), v6(s), w&)) ds + E. (3.5) 
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Because of the hypotheses (HI), (Ha), and (H5), the theory of differential 
inequalities, gives (see [8]) the estimate 
L(4 x8(t)) < us(t), to < t < to + T. 
This, in view of hypotheses (Ha) and (Ha) yields 
H(4 xyt>, r”(t), -%(t)) 6 w, w, W), w&N (3.6) 
noting that v”(t) = L,(yS(t)) and wus(t) = L,(+(t)). The claim (i) now follows 
from inequalities (3.4), (3.5), and (3.6) on taking the limit as E, 6 -+ 0. 
The proof of (ii) follows similarly by using the inequalities 
v,,, 2 SFL , z*1 - E and Vl*, < WC?, f81 + E. 
This completes the proof of the theorem. 
THEOREM 3.2. Let the hypotheses of Theorem 3.1 hold. Assume further that 
the following decomposition is valid: 
F(t, x, Y, 4 = F,(t, x, Y) + F,(t, x, 4, 
qt, x, y, z> = K(t, x, Y) + H2(t, x, x)9 
f  (4 4 74 w) = f&, % v) + fi(C u, 4, 
h(t, u, v, w) = h,(t, u, v) + h(t, u, w), 
and in (H4) and (HJ, a Lipschitz condition in place of uniqueness us in [4]. I f  
p, q are uniformly continuous functionals and h, H are continuous, then V, < V, . 
Proof: Under the additional restrictions imposed in the theorem, it is 
known [4] that the two games have values. Consequently, Theorem 3.1 
assures the stated result. 
We now give an example to demonstrate our result. 
EXAMPLE. Consider the differential game associated with, the differential 
system 
x1’ = x2 - Xl3 + y + z, x,(O) = 0, 
X2’ =x2(1--x,)$-y---z, Y,(O) = 19 
and the payoff 
P= l X12(4 
S[ 0 
2 + x2(s) + Y(S) - +)] ds. 
Let - 1 < y, x < 1. Let the scalar game be given by 
u’=u+2+v-w, u(0) = 1 
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with - 1 < v, w < 1 and with the payoff 
Q = j-1 [u(s) + v(s) - w(s)] ds. 
We choose L(t, x) = & xl2 + x2 , L,(y) = y, and L,(z) = x. It is easy to 
verify the assumptions of Theorem 3.2 noting that 
L(t,,x,) =u#J= 1; wt, x, y, 4 = a qt, X>,&(Y), &(@); 
and 
D+Jqt, 4 d qt, 3) + 2 + y - z = f(4 -w, 4, L,(Y), W)). 
Considering the scalar game, it is obvious that v will choose e)(t) = 1 and 
w will choose w(t) = 1. Hence 
V, = 
s 
’ (3et - 2) dt = 3e - 5. 
0 
Consequently, we have by Theorem 3.2, V, < 3e - 5. 
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